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I. INTRODUCTION
The duty to monitor sits at the crossroads between the two fundamental fiduciary duties of corporations law: the duty of care and
the duty of loyalty. Much of corporations law focuses on what directors should do when they make decisions for the corporation. The duty of care tells them to act with “the care of an ordinarily prudent
person in the same or similar circumstances.”1 The duty of loyalty
tells them to “exercise [their] institutional power . . . in a good-faith
effort to advance the interests of the company.”2 Both duties tell directors to protect the interests of the corporation.
The difficult question is whether the board breaches any of its fiduciary duties when its inattention or inaction leads to harm to the
corporation. The duty to monitor addresses this question by imposing
liability on directors for failing to respond to signs of wrongdoing, illegality, or other harmful activities. Because the duty to monitor imposes liability based on what the board failed to do, it is difficult to
define the scope of liability.3 A natural dilemma exists in evaluating
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center
on Corporate Governance, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York, NY. E-mail:
epan@yu.edu. I am grateful for helpful comments from Steven Davidoff, Arthur Jacobson,
Maggie Lemos, Uriel Procaccia, Stewart Sterk, Matteo Tonello, Verity Winship, and
Charles Yablon and thank Val Myteberi and Arielle Katzman for their invaluable research
assistance.
1. WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES
AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 240 (3d ed. 2009); see also REVISED
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1985); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (1994).
2. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 1, at 295.
3. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(describing the duty to monitor as “a board decision that results in a loss because that decision was ill advised or ‘negligent’ ” and “an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss”).
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a director’s level of care or loyalty based purely on the fact that there
was an absence of action by such director. Unless the director’s failure to act was the product of deliberation (which takes the matter
outside of the scope of the duty to monitor), no records, witnesses, or
other readily available pieces of evidence will be available to inform a
court whether the board’s failure to act was an act of carelessness or
disloyalty. As a result, when adjudicating claims alleging inattention
or inaction by a board, a court faces the uncomfortable task of exercising its own independent judgment that the board should have done
something instead of remaining still and silent.
At the same time, the duty to monitor serves as the best means
the law has to ensure that directors are attentive and vigilant
against the occurrence of harm to the corporation. To the extent we
believe and expect a board to perform a substantial role in managing
the corporation—as opposed to serving merely as review and approval bodies for the wants and wishes of officers—it is appropriate to
hold boards to a high monitoring standard. Ideally, little should affect the corporation without the knowledge, consent, or consideration
of the board.
This Article criticizes the Delaware doctrine of the duty to monitor.4 Delaware courts have defined too narrowly the scope of the duty
and have made it undesirably difficult for plaintiffs to bring forward
duty to monitor claims. As it is currently conceived, the duty to monitor rewards ignorance and passivity by directors, imposing little obligation on them to take an active interest in the corporation’s business. By limiting the scope of the duty only to cases of wrongdoing
and illegality, the doctrine encourages directors to focus on legal
compliance at the expense of business performance—an odd result
when boards are usually stocked with persons touted for their business, not legal, acumen. The focus on legal compliance also encourages government authorities to criminalize a broader scope of corporate activities, as this is the only way to ensure directors follow desirable corporate governance practices.
In addition, by requiring plaintiffs to plead a high degree of specificity as to what the directors knew of possible harm to the corporation, the doctrine incentivizes directors to avoid asking questions or
otherwise making efforts to uncover possible red flags. Such efforts
serve only to increase the number of occasions when directors may
find themselves forced to act to satisfy their duty to monitor or to
produce paper trails enabling plaintiffs to bring forward additional
4. This Article focuses on the duty to monitor in Delaware in recognition of Delaware’s position as the leading corporate law jurisdiction in the United States. Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 391
(2003) (providing statistics of the most popular jurisdictions of incorporation for U.S. companies).
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duty to monitor claims. The doctrine instead encourages directors to
rouse themselves only when red flags are thrown up by existing internal control systems, like the drunk who only looks for his lost keys
under the street lamp because that is where the light is.
This Article sets forth four objections to how Delaware courts have
defined directors’ duty to monitor. First, the Delaware doctrine is inconsistent with the role of the board in the corporation. Boards serve
both a monitoring and managerial role in the corporation, and the
duty to monitor should provide the proper incentives for boards to
fulfill this preferred role.
Second, the Delaware doctrine is wrong to excuse boards from
monitoring business risk. Rather, boards should be held responsible
for business as well as legal outcomes, and courts should shift the
burden onto them to show that they have made the effort to be informed and to respond to developments producing such outcomes.
Third, the recasting of the duty to monitor as a claim of bad faith
conduct has imposed an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs to bring
forward meritorious duty to monitor claims. In an attempt to respect
the Delaware courts’ desire to cast the duty to monitor as part of the
duty of loyalty, this Article argues that Delaware courts could ease
the burden on plaintiffs by making clear that the definition of scienter includes demonstration of recklessness and treating a director’s
failure to monitor as a rebuttable presumption. Such changes would
be faithful to the reasoning of Caremark while still respecting the
Delaware Supreme Court’s conception of the duty to monitor as part
of the good faith and loyalty framework.
Fourth, Delaware courts have not provided adequate guidance as to
when the duty to monitor should apply. The current doctrine emphasizes board action only in the face of a red flag but leaves ambiguous the
board’s duty to monitor in the aftermath of a past decision. Courts
should note that a board’s responsibility does not end at the moment of
voting but includes ensuring that its decisions remain appropriate over
time and in the best interests of the corporation. These changes reinforce
the fact that Delaware courts cannot shy away from reviewing cases
where a board’s failure to monitor results in harmful business outcomes.
This Article recognizes a common objection to any set of reforms
aimed at strengthening the scope of fiduciary duties: directors enjoy
numerous protections against personal liability. Even though indemnification and director and officer insurance shield them from personal liability, directors face very real reputational costs if they fail to meet their
fiduciary obligations and will look to judges for guidance regarding their
responsibilities. Therefore, this Article concludes that expansion of the
scope of the duty to monitor will have a real effect on directors’ behavior
toward risk management and managerial oversight.
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II. THE DELAWARE DOCTRINE OF THE DUTY TO MONITOR
In an earlier article, I analyzed in detail the cases that have given
meaning to the duty to monitor under Delaware law—an analysis
that this Article now builds upon to frame a series of objections to the
doctrine.5 The four cases that have defined Delaware’s duty to monitor are: Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,6 In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,7 Stone v. Ritter,8 and In
re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation.9 Graham introduced the notion that boards have a duty to act when they become
aware of wrongdoing (i.e., red flags).10 Caremark explained why
boards have an obligation not only to act in the face of obvious signs
of wrongdoing but also to be informed of, and to watch for, wrongdoing.11 Stone defined breach of the duty to monitor as an act of bad
faith and therefore a breach of the duty of loyalty.12 Finally,
Citigroup effectively has closed the door on duty to monitor claims
pertaining to boards’ failure to monitor business risk.13
The duty to monitor depends on two elements: what efforts the
board must take to detect possible harm, and what types of possible
harm require board action. The current standard for assessing what
efforts must be taken by the board is whether the board “utterly
fail[s] to implement any reporting or information system or controls”
or if “having implemented such . . . system[s] or controls, consciously
fail[s] to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves
from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”14
Courts have recognized a breach of a duty to monitor only when
board inaction or inattention leads to wrongful acts or violations of
law.15 Courts have never found a breach of the duty to monitor in
cases involving business harm to the corporation in the absence of
wrongful acts or violations of the law.
The path by which the Delaware courts developed their understanding of the duty to monitor is not a straight one. In the Caremark decision, Chancellor Allen provided a rationale for a quite ex5. See Eric J. Pan, A Board’s Duty to Monitor, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 717 (2009).
6. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
7. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
8. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
9. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
10. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
11. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967. Hillary Sale has called Caremark “one of the most
prominent Delaware opinions of all time.” Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good
Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 719-20 (2007). Because Chancellor William Allen’s opinion
in Caremark remains the most complete exploration by a Delaware court of the meaning of
the duty to monitor, duty to monitor claims are often referred to as “Caremark claims.”
12. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
13. See Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126.
14. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
15. See, e.g., Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
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pansive duty to monitor—a duty that would require boards to be attentive to a broad range of legal and business harms to the corporation. According to Chancellor Allen, a board’s duty to monitor stems
from the “seriousness” of its role in the management of the corporation.16 Such a serious role logically should mean that directors bear
ultimate responsibility for preventing harm to the corporation and
that directors’ ignorance of, or unfamiliarity with, any such harm
would signify a failure to meet such responsibilities. Chancellor Allen
also believed that having monitoring systems in place was essential
to boards meeting their supervisory and monitoring role, and that
this obligation to continuously collect “relevant and timely information” (and by implication, review such information) stems not only
from a fiduciary obligation but from section 141 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law—the statutory provision stating that the
corporation shall be managed at the direction of the board.17 Ignorance cannot be the natural state of the board. As a decisionmaker
and consumer of information, the board must make efforts to be informed and cannot avoid being held accountable for any developments that may affect the corporation’s performance.
Furthermore, in discussing the rationale for the duty to monitor,
Chancellor Allen noted that the board’s responsibility to be informed
was to prevent not only legal harm but also business harm.18 Boards
must assure themselves that they have in place an information and
reporting system that permits the board to make “informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its
business performance.”19 Thus, the duty to monitor should extend to
harm resulting from illegal or wrongful acts and also business developments. Chancellor Allen, however, ultimately did not address in
his decision the problem of failure to monitor business performance.
He limited his analysis of the duty to monitor to “losses caused by
non-compliance with applicable legal standards,” as the facts of the
Caremark case pertained only to the failure of the board to prevent
legal violations by employees.20 After Caremark, Delaware courts
have declined to embrace fully Chancellor Allen’s rationale for the
duty to monitor and instead have recognized the applicability of the
duty to monitor in only a range of cases involving wrongdoing
and illegality.
Ten years later in Stone, the Delaware Supreme Court revised the
Caremark standard: first, by equating the duty to monitor with the

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 968-69.
Id. at 970.
Id.
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duty of good faith;21 second, by subsuming the duty of good faith into
the duty of loyalty22 (Chancellor Allen considered the duty to monitor
to be part of the duty of care23);24 and third, by requiring plaintiffs
meet a high standard of scienter to prove directors acted in bad
faith.25 The Stone formulation of the duty to monitor standard is captured in the paragraph:
Caremark articulates the necessary conditions predicate for director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly failed to implement
any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor
or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention. In either
case, imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors
knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.
Where directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act,
thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that
fiduciary obligation in good faith.26

21. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
22. Id. at 369-70.
23. See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967-68.
24. Ambiguous drafting of section 102(b)(7) and references to a duty of good faith in
earlier Delaware cases gave the impression that good faith was either an independent fiduciary duty that stood alongside the duties of care and loyalty or represented a means of
measuring the degree of success that a fiduciary achieved in meeting her duty of care. In
previous cases, the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to recognize that the duty of good
faith, along with the duties of care and loyalty, formed a “triad” of fiduciary duties. See,
e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (defining a triad of fiduciary duties to consist of the duty of good faith, duty of loyalty, and duty of care). The Delaware Supreme Court frequently re-emphasized the existence of this triad of fiduciary
duties. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998). For many commentators, recognition of an independent
duty of good faith was desirable in order to hold directors and officers accountable for certain acts that did not constitute classic cases of disloyalty but were so egregious that they
should be beyond section 102(b)(7) exculpation. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004) [hereinafter Sale, Delaware’s
Good Faith].
25. The court identified a scienter requirement to prove a breach of the duty to monitor, stating “imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they
were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.” Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (citing with approval Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003)); see also Wood v. Baum, 953
A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (“Where, as here, directors are exculpated from liability except
for claims based on ‘fraudulent,’ ‘illegal’ or ‘bad faith’ conduct, a plaintiff must also plead
particularized facts that demonstrate that the directors acted with scienter . . . .”); Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007). In order to show scienter, plaintiffs must
“plead particularized facts . . . that [the directors] had ‘actual or constructive knowledge’
that their conduct was legally improper.” Wood, 953 A.2d at 141; see also Guttman, 823
A.2d at 506 (“[The Caremark standard] premises liability on a showing that the directors
were conscious of the fact that they were not doing their jobs.”).
26. Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (second emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to bring duty to monitor claims. The court placed the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate a director’s scienter in failing to
act in the face of red flags. The lack of clarity from the Delaware
courts as to how plaintiffs can meet this requirement in the absence
of board deliberation undermined the effectiveness of the duty
to monitor.
Finally, the recent Citigroup decision has narrowed the substantive limits of the duty to monitor. In this case, Chancellor Chandler
considered a shareholder derivative suit against the Citigroup board
for failing to prevent losses incurred by the bank holding company
from its substantial investments in mortgage-backed securities.27
These investments resulted in near catastrophic losses for Citigroup,
producing great losses to shareholders and forcing the bank to submit to two federal government bailouts.28 The plaintiffs argued that
the Citigroup board failed to oversee the corporation’s exposure to the
mortgage-backed securities market and ignored several red flags that
warned the board of the deteriorating subprime mortgage market.29
Chancellor Chandler rejected the plaintiffs’ claims. He decided
that a claim to hold directors responsible for failing to prevent business harm would undermine the business judgment rule.30 The purpose of the business judgment rule is “to allow corporate managers
and directors to pursue risky transactions without the specter of being held personally liable if those decisions turn out poorly.”31 Chancellor Chandler appears to believe that failing to monitor business
risk is the same as deciding to assume a business risk—a questionable assertion. Chancellor Chandler is understandably concerned
that any evaluation by a court of the board’s responsiveness to busi27. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 111 (Del. Ch. 2009).
28. See Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 30, 2008) (announcing sale of $25
billion in preferred stock and warrants to the U.S. Treasury Department); Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2008) (announcing $40 billion capital benefit provided by U.S.
Treasury Department, Federal Reserve Board and Federal Deposit Corporation); see also David
Enrich, et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup—Plan Injects $20 Billion in Fresh
Capital, Guarantees $306 Billion in Toxic Assets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2008, at A1. Citigroup’s
share price fell 86% between December 31, 2004, and December 31, 2008. On December 31,
2004, Citigroup’s stock was trading at $48.18 per share. On December 31, 2008, Citigroup’s
stock
was
trading
at
$6.71
per
share.
See,
e.g.,
YAHOO!
FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=C&a=11&b=31&c=2004&d=11&e=31&f=2008&g=d
(last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
29. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 114; see also id. at 126-27 (“The allegations in the Complaint amount essentially to a claim that Citigroup suffered large losses and that there
were certain warning signs that could or should have put defendants on notice of the business risks related to Citigroup’s investments in subprime assets.”).
30. Id. at 126.
31. Id. at 125; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“It is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.”).
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ness risk would mean judging the merits of the board’s actions after
the fact.32 As he noted, courts must be careful to avoid the danger of
hindsight bias (i.e., “the tendency for [someone] with knowledge of an
outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome
could have been predicted”).33 Chancellor Chandler narrowed the duty to monitor by ruling that, except in the most extreme cases, which
he left unspecified,34 a board should never be held liable for failing to
monitor business risk.35
Since Stone, Delaware courts have often dismissed several plaintiffs’
attempts to argue that directors face a substantial likelihood of personal
liability from duty to monitor claims.36 In dismissing the claims, the
courts have either focused on whether plaintiffs have “pled sufficient
facts to meet the scienter requirement or, in the case of Citigroup, have
excused the board from having any monitoring” duty.37
III. RETHINKING THE DUTY TO MONITOR
There are four objections to the Delaware courts’ treatment of the
duty to monitor. First, a broader duty to monitor is crucial to enforcing the board’s proper role as monitor and manager of the corporation. Implicit in the Delaware recognition of a weak duty to monitor
is the assumption that boards do not play an active role in the management of the corporation and, therefore, should not be expected to
have knowledge of harmful events except in the occasional cases
where passive monitoring systems may detect such events. Such an
assumption is inconsistent with the appropriate role of the board in
the corporation. Boards should serve both a monitoring and managerial role in the corporation, and the duty to monitor should provide
the proper incentives for boards to fulfill this preferred role.
Second, Delaware courts are wrong to excuse boards from managing business risk and understanding the likelihood of harm to the
corporation’s business. Rather, boards should be held responsible for
business as well as legal outcomes. Courts should shift the burden

32. Citigroup, 964 A.2d. at 124-26.
33. See id. at 124 n.50. Having the court give in to hindsight bias would make boards
overly cautious and hypersensitive to hazardous activity, encouraging overinvestment
in monitoring.
34. See id. at 126 (“In this case, plaintiffs allege that the defendants are liable for
failing to properly monitor the risk that Citigroup faced from subprime securities. While it
may be possible for a plaintiff to meet the burden under some set of facts, plaintiffs in this
case have failed to state a Caremark claim sufficient to excuse demand based on a theory
that the directors did not fulfill their oversight obligations by failing to monitor the business risk of the company.” (emphasis added)).
35. See id. at 124, 129-31.
36. See Pan, supra note 5, at 733-34.
37. See id. at 734.
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onto directors to show that they made an effort to be informed and to
respond to developments leading to such outcomes.
Third, the recasting of the duty to monitor as a claim of bad faith
conduct imposes an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs to bring forward meritorious duty to monitor claims. This Article argues that
Delaware courts could lower the burden on plaintiffs by adopting a
definition of scienter that includes demonstration of recklessness (or
at least deliberate recklessness) and treating a director’s failure to
monitor as a rebuttable presumption. Such a change would be faithful to the reasoning of Caremark while still respecting the Delaware
Supreme Court’s conception of the duty to monitor as part of the good
faith and loyalty framework.
Fourth, the current doctrine leaves ambiguous the board’s duty to
monitor in the aftermath of a past decision. Courts should note that a
board’s responsibility does not end when it votes on an issue but includes ensuring that its decisions remain appropriate over time and
in the best interests of the corporation. Recognizing the appropriate
scope of the board’s responsibilities means Delaware courts cannot
shy away from reviewing those cases where a board decision may lay
the condition for harmful business outcomes. It is important for Delaware courts to clarify the boundary line between business judgment
and failure to monitor.
A. Board as Monitor and Manager
Boards play two complementary roles. First, they monitor the performance of officers. They are elected representatives of the shareholders and responsible for the appointment of the CEO and other
officers. They also serve as managers. They participate in the corporate decisionmaking process, working with the CEO in setting strategy. Given their importance in monitoring and contributing to management, courts should have high expectations for what boards can
and should be able to do to oversee the risks of the corporation.
The authority of boards is absolute. Section 141(a) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law is representative of the general rule in U.S.
corporation law that, “[t]he business and affairs of every corporation .
. . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided . . . in its certificate of incorporation.”38 While the law grants boards the sole power to manage the

38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation) (emphasis added); see also N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 2010); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §
8.01 (2005).
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corporation, boards in practice delegate most management responsibility to officers.39
If boards are not supposed to be either full-time managers or corporate owners, what is their proper role? To the extent the concentration of managerial authority in the hands of a group of professional
officers undermines shareholder value, boards must assume an active
role in the management of the corporation, limiting the power of the
officers. Boards should act as monitors, collecting and evaluating information about the performance of officers and the effectiveness of
corporate strategy. Boards also must act as managers, offering advice
concerning or, if necessary, dictating corporate strategy. These roles
are not separable. A board cannot carry out its managerial role without first collecting information about corporate operations through its
monitoring activities. Nor can the board fulfill its monitoring role
without having the ability to affect corporate strategy and respond to
negative developments.
Agency theory and resource dependency theory explain why
boards operate as both monitors and managers. Agency theory assumes that managers, if given the opportunity, will pursue their personal interests at the expense of those of the shareholders.40 Consequently, efforts must be made to align the interests of managers and
shareholders. Such pressure on managers can come from external
and internal sources. For example, the market for corporate control
provides outside pressure on managers.41 Managerial underperfor39. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 106-08 (1986) (noting that while the board
is supposed to supervise the entire business, the actual amount of work performed by the
board is actually much more modest). Under Delaware law, officers are the creation of the
board. The board appoints officers as it sees fit and gives officers their power. Even the
chief executive officer depends on the board for her authority to conduct business on behalf
of the corporation. Title 8, section 142 of the Delaware Code states “[e]very corporation
organized under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be
stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors . . . .” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 142 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); see also Grimes v. Donald, No. CIV. A.
13358, slip op. at 8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 1995), aff’d, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (“A fundamental precept of Delaware corporation law is that it is the board of directors, and neither
shareholders nor managers, that has ultimate responsibility for the management of the
enterprise. Of course, given the large, complex organizations through which modern, multifunction business corporations often operate, the law recognizes that corporate boards,
comprised as they traditionally have been of persons dedicating less than all of their attention to that role, cannot themselves manage the operations of the firm, but may satisfy
their obligations by thoughtfully appointing officers, establishing or approving goals and
plans and monitoring performance.” (internal citations omitted)); Oliver E. Williamson,
Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247, 259
(2008) (enumerating the benefits of delegation from the board to officers).
40. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 740-48 (1997).
41. But see Mark R. Huson, Robert Parrino & Laura T. Starks, Internal Monitoring
Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective, 56 J. FIN. 2265, 2295-96 (2001)
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mance makes a corporation more attractive to takeover attempts.
Incentive-based compensation offers internal pressure. Awarding equity allows managers to benefit from the maximization of shareholder value.42
The most important mechanisms to address the agency problem,
however, are those that facilitate direct monitoring of managers by
shareholders. For example, much emphasis in recent years has been
given to the role of institutional investors in monitoring managers.43 As
the largest shareholders, institutional investors are in the best position
to overcome the collective action problem and defend shareholder interests. Others have argued for better access by shareholders to proxy
statements,44 requirements that directors receive majority support from

(finding that evidence does not fully support the theory that a more active takeover market
strengthens internal control mechanisms).
42. See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 864-65 (1993) (arguing in support of awarding
equity interests to managers as incentive devices); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20
J. FIN. ECON. 293, 306-07 (1988) (finding evidence of a positive relationship between a
board member’s equity ownership in the firm and the market value of that firm).
43. See generally Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
863 (1991); Steven Huddart, The Effect of a Large Shareholder on Corporate Value, 39
MGMT. SCI. 1407 (1993). But very large shareholders may seek to retain for themselves
certain rents of the corporation at the expense of other, more scattered shareholders. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 661-62 (1999); David A. Skeel,
Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1529 (2004) (book review). Others
have noted that many institutional investors are passive, long-term investors, having little
interest in being active monitors of the corporation and allowing other investors to set the
shareholder agenda. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1352-53 (1991); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on
a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1082-84 (2008). But others view institutional investors as a harmful and impatient force, pressuring executives to pursue quick
profits and take on excessive risk. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Jay W. Lorsch & Theodore N.
Mirvis, A Crisis is a Terrible Thing to Waste: The Proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights Act
of
2009”
is
a
Serious
Mistake
(May
12,
2009),
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.16657.09.pdf.
44. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 462 F.3d
121, 131 (2d Cir. 2006) (acknowledging the policy debate regarding shareholder access to
the corporate ballot); Press Release, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Propose Rule
Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to Nominate Directors (May 20, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-116.htm.
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shareholders,45 approval by shareholders of executive compensation,46
and rights for shareholders to propose charter amendments.47
Having shareholders monitor managers, however, is problematic.
Shareholders’ authority stems primarily from their power to elect
members of the board, but this power is limited. Shareholders must
rely on boards to exercise appropriate control over officers. If boards
fail to do so, shareholders’ only recourse is to elect new directors. This
option presumes that shareholders have alternative candidates. Often, candidates nominated by the CEO dominate board elections, and
current rules make it expensive for shareholders to propose their own
candidates.48 Therefore, any increase in the influence of shareholders
over managers depends on boards’ willingness to more aggressively
monitor the performance of officers.49 A more robust duty to monitor
for boards helps resolve this agency problem.
According to resource dependency theory, directors provide valuable resources to the corporation.50 Directors, who are selected for
their skills, experience, and connections, contribute personal capital
to the corporation whether by providing strategic advice to officers,
identifying new business opportunities, assisting in government relations, or establishing new relationships. A board consisting of former
regulatory officials, financial institution executives, or lawyers would
give the corporation access to information about regulatory processes,
to financial credit, or legal advice.51 Directors use their personal rela45. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting,
96 GEO. L.J. 1227 (2008).
46. See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins & Randall S. Thomas, Should Shareholders Have a
Greater Say Over Executive Pay?: Learning from the US Experience 10-12 (Vand. Univ. L.
Sch.
Law
&
Econ.,
Research
Paper
No.
01-6,
2001),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=268992.
47. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 865-67 (2005).
48. See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards
of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96 (1998). Hermalin
and Weisbach also cite the study conducted by Harry and Linda DeAngelo finding that
when dissident shareholders challenge the officers’ recommended directors, the shareholders only succeed in winning a board seat one-third of the time. See Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN.
ECON. 29, 30 (1989).
49. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 313-15 (1983) (noting that the board is a lower cost mechanism to
control management than the market for corporate control); Benjamin M. Oviatt, Agency
and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-Shareholder Relationship: Incentives for
Congruent Interests, 13 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 214 (1988).
50. See, e.g., Amy J. Hillman, Albert A. Cannella, Jr. & Ramona L. Paetzold, The Resource Dependence Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic Adaptation of Board Composition
in Response to Environmental Change, 37 J. MGMT. STUD. 235, 236 (2000).
51. See, e.g., Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta, Regulation and the Evolution of Corporate Boards: Monitoring, Advising, or Window Dressing?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 167 (2004) (studying the impact of political directors on natural gas companies between 1930 and 1998 and
finding that such corporations add political directors for their regulatory expertise).
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tionships, skills, and reputation to advance the corporation’s interests. Directors also draw upon their experience and expertise to make
valuable cognitive contributions to corporate decisionmaking.52 For
resource dependency theory to hold true, the CEO must work closely
with the board to exploit these valuable resources. Likewise, in order
for the board to be useful to the corporation, the board must be intimately familiar with the objectives and operations of the corporation.
This need is particularly true in situations where the director provides value to the corporation by drawing upon her experience and
decisionmaking skills to help plan corporate strategy.53
These theories suggest that the proper role of the board is that of
both monitor and manager, and empirical studies have shown that
these two roles are pursued in practice.54 Under agency theory, the
board is valued for its ability to keep officers in check so that they
work in the interests of shareholders. Resource dependency theory,
on the other hand, places a premium on a board’s ability to add value
as part of the decisionmaking and strategic planning process.
Two objections are commonly made to this depiction of the board
as monitor and manager. The first objection comes from those who
believe boards are controlled by the powerful CEO and offer little
check on executive authority. Studies by Myles Mace and by Jay
Lorsch and Elizabeth MacIver famously depicted the board as the
junior partner to the CEO.55 The CEO’s dominance of the board is a
result of a variety of factors. Officers have a monopoly on inside information. Directors have to rely on the officers to keep them informed. Officers are professional managers who are employed fulltime by the corporation. Directors often have a more diverse range of
backgrounds and spend only a fraction of their time on board business. The CEO and other officers frequently have seats on the board
and, therefore, can exert direct control over board decisions. This
power of the CEO over the board is frequently reflected by the fact
that the CEO also serves as chairman of the board. Even if the board
52. See Violina P. Rindova, What Corporate Boards Have to Do with Strategy: A Cognitive Perspective, 36 J. MGMT. STUD. 953 (1999). Rindova observes that among the many
contributions that boards make to strategic planning, boards contribute their diverse experience which serves a valuable source of knowledge from which management can draw
upon to make superior decisions. Id. at 960.
53. See Kenneth R. Andrews, Directors’ Responsibility for Corporate Strategy, 104
HARV. BUS. REV. 30, 30-31 (1980). See generally Ari Ginsberg, Minding the Competition:
From Mapping to Mastery, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 153 (1994); Tom Perkins, The ‘Compliance’ Board, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2007, at A11 (arguing for a “guidance board” involved
deeply in strategy, tactics, technology, and engineering reviews).
54. See Amy J. Hillman & Thomas Dalziel, Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
383, 388 (2003) (describing the results of a study performed by Korn/Ferry International).
55. See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 185-86, 188 (1971); JAY W.
LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS (1989).

222

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:209

is not composed of corporate insiders, the CEO often controls the
nomination of new directors, making it more likely that the board
will be compliant and receptive to the views of the CEO. Not surprisingly, this image of the board shaped by Mace, Lorsch and MacIver,
and others has encouraged the belief that directors are incapable and
ill-equipped to provide effective oversight of officers.56
Corporate governance reform efforts over the past twenty years,
however, have sought to address many of these problems. There has
developed a strong view as to corporate governance best practices
designed to promote board independence and to enable the board to
challenge decisions of the CEO.57 Some of these practices have been
made mandatory for public companies under federal securities law
and stock exchange listing rules.58 Such practices include: requiring a
majority of directors to be independent;59 creating audit, compensation, and nominating committees composed of independent directors;60 having boards hold executive sessions outside the presence of
officers;61
and
separating
the
positions
of
CEO
and

56. See, e.g., ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 202-03
(3d ed. 2004).
57. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 238-39 (1997) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Board of Directors] (citing
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Committee
on Corporate Laws, ABA, Corporate Director’s Guidebook 1994 Edition, 49 BUS. LAW. 1247,
1249 (1994), and Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness, March, 1990, 46 BUS. LAW. 241, 246 (1990)); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468-69 (2007). But see Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira,
A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 220 (2007) (“First, the CEO dislikes monitoring
by the board because he values control. Second, the CEO likes advising by the board because
advice increases firm value without interfering with his choices. Third, both monitoring and
advising by the board are more effective when the board is better informed. Finally, in both
roles, the board depends crucially on the CEO for firm-specific information.”).
58. See, e.g., Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 79 SEC Docket 2876, 2878 (Apr. 9. 2003); 17 C.F.R. § 240-10A-3(b) (2009) (codifying Exchange Act Rule
10-A-3(b));
NYSE
Listed
Company
Manual
§
303A.02
(2010),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4%
5F3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F.
59. See E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good
Corporate Governance Practices—Or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184 (“Although
independence of directors may not necessarily guarantee the best economic return to
stockholders, I think the better view, generally, is that a worthwhile goal is to have a significant majority of independent directors on the board. Independence offers to investors
some assurance that the governance process has integrity.”).
60. See Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New
Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829 (1999) (finding that when the CEO
serves on the nominating committee or where there is no nominating committee the board
consists of fewer independent directors and stock price reaction to independent director
appointments is lower).
61. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What’s Right and What’s Wrong?, 15 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 15 (2003).
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board chairman.62 As many companies have put into place these reforms, boards of U.S. corporations have assumed a much more active
role in monitoring the performance of the corporation.63 Many directors accept their role as monitors and have sought to increase the degree to which they oversee officers.64
A second objection is that the monitoring and managing roles of
the board are inherently inconsistent.65 The argument is that boards
which are involved in the management of the corporation lose the
objectivity they need to be effective managerial monitors or, alternatively, have a harmful, adversarial relationship with management.66
This argument implies that to the extent we want boards to be suppliers of “board capital” to management, we cannot expect them to be
effective monitors. But in reality, boards carry out both functions,
and the degree to which a board acts as monitor or manager depends
on the special characteristics of the corporation.67 Furthermore, the
62. See, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Theory and Practice: Chairman-CEO Split Gains Allies—
Corporate Leaders Push for Firms to Improve Oversight by Separating Roles, WALL ST. J., Mar.
30, 2009, at B4 (reporting that by March 2008, shareholders submitted thirty-nine resolutions
seeking to require the split of the board chair and the chief executive officer); see also MILLSTEIN
CTR. FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & PERFORMANCE, CHAIRING THE BOARD: THE CASE FOR
INDEPENDENT
LEADERSHIP
IN
CORPORATE
NORTH
AMERICA
(2009),
http://millstein.som.yale.edu/2009%2003%2030%20Chairing%20The%20Board%20final.pdf
(recommending that all North American public companies elect to have an independent
chair of the board of directors).
63. See, e.g., William R. Boulton, The Evolving Board: A Look at the Board’s Changing
Roles and Information Needs, 3 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 827, 828 (1978) (observing from fortyfive interviews with CEOs and directors of seven large U.S. companies that “[t]he changing
of the board’s role is seen as a process of evolution in which the board moves beyond providing basic legitimacy for the corporation to more actively auditing the results of corporate
performance and, finally, to playing an involved role of questioning the viability of the
firm’s long-term direction and success.”); Paul W. MacAvoy & Ira M. Millstein, The Active
Board of Directors and Its Effect on the Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation,
11 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 8-11 (1999); see also Eisenberg, Board of Directors, supra note 57, at
238-39 (describing the “monitoring model of the board [as] almost universally accepted”).
64. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 61, at 15 (citing a survey of 2,000 directors
in the United States conducted before the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reporting that
the directors “consistently favored more monitoring than was the practice on the boards on
which they served”).
65. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin
Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 632-38 (1982); Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 280-82 (1997). But see Praveen Kumar & K. Sivaramakrishnan, Who
Monitors the Monitor? The Effect of Board Independence on Executive Compensation and
Firm Value, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 1371 (2008) (finding that board independence and board
incentive pay are substitutes which permit independent boards to be less effective monitors
than less independent boards).
66. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1753-59 (2001) (noting
that constant conflict between directors and officers is harmful to the corporation). One
result of an adversarial relationship is that boards end up second-guessing the CEO and
inhibiting CEO initiative. See Ira M. Millstein, The Professional Board, 50 BUS. LAW. 1427,
1433 (1995).
67. See Fisch, supra note 65, at 282-89; see also Renée B. Adams, What do Boards do?
Evidence from Board Committee and Director Compensation Data (Mar. 13, 2003) (un-
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skills that enable boards to play a role in management are also the
skills that make boards better monitors.68 Boards would have a better
understanding of the business and, therefore, would be in a better
position to identify inefficiencies and undesirable risks. Boards also
require a requisite amount of managerial experience to evaluate
properly the performance of officers. Stronger legal rules, such as the
one argued for by this Article, that push directors to be better informed and remain cognizant of their ultimate responsibilities to the
shareholders should help ensure that directors are not captured by
the CEO and fail to be vigilant monitors. Thus, concerns that the
managerial board model conflicts with a monitoring board model
should be rejected.
A more robust duty to monitor will improve board effectiveness as
monitor and manager. The proposed corporate governance reforms,
discussed above, focus on the board’s independence from the CEO.
Promoting board independence, however, assumes that if the CEO’s
influence over the board is curbed, the board will naturally become a
better monitor,69 but empirical evidence does not support this assumption.70 While these reforms may make it easier for boards to be
more vigorous monitors, they do not provide a convincing explanation
for why boards actually would want to take on the headaches of challenging the CEO.71 One reform designed to better align the interests
published working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=397401 (finding that
boards of diversified firms spend more time monitoring while boards of growing firms
spend more time on strategic planning). Donald Langevoort has argued that the ideal
board structure may consist of a combination of monitoring and managerial directors accompanied by one of two directors who serve as mediators. See Donald C. Langevoort, The
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 815 (2001) [hereinafter Langevoort,
The Human Nature of Corporate Boards].
68. See Hillman & Dalziel, supra note 54, at 389; see also Mason A. Carpenter &
James D. Westphal, The Strategic Context of External Network Ties: Examining the Impact
of Director Appointments on Board Involvement in Strategic Decision Making, 44 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 639 (2001); Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS.
LAW. 1375, 1411 (2006) [hereinafter Sale, Independent Directors] (referring to director reports that greater independence and monitoring actually improves the relationship between the board and CEO and enables boards to request more information from executive
officers about corporate strategy).
69. See Hermalin & Weisbach, supra note 48, at 97. But see Langevoort, The Human
Nature of Corporate Boards, supra note 67, at 807 (noting how overconfident outside directors, unchecked by inside directors, may result in biased decisionmaking).
70. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board
Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 921-22 (1999); see also James D.
Westphal, Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Structural Board Independence
from Management, 43 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 511, 512 (1998).
71. Victor Brudney notes that there is no reason why one should assume that independent directors desire to be serious monitors. Brudney, supra note 65, at 609-16. Charles
Yablon, however, argues that the power of CEOs has actually decreased over the past
twenty years. Charles M. Yablon, Is the Market for CEOs Rational?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS.
89, 123-27 (2007). He notes that the average tenure of CEOs at U.S. corporations has decreased and there has been an increased rate of firing of CEOs. Id. at 123.

2011]

RETHINKING THE BOARD’S DUTY TO MONITOR

225

of boards with shareholders in improving shareholder value is to give
directors stock options. In theory, a share of the corporation’s equity
will motivate directors to take a greater interest in the activities of the
corporation and “crack the whip” when officers fail to perform.72 But
equity compensation is a blunt instrument to ensure greater board attention.73 Alternatively, reformers hope that increasing the threat of
removal by activist shareholders will spur directors to act more in the
interests of shareholders. Here too, the threat of removal seems to be a
suboptimal corporate governance strategy, as incumbent directors continue to enjoy strong advantages in winning reelection.74
Incredibly, the role of fiduciary duties in motivating directors to be
better monitors is absent from the debate.75 The misalignment of interests between shareholders and boards, and the high transaction
costs associated with the use of shareholder voting and incentive
compensation packages to motivate directors produce a textbook case
for the use of fiduciary duties, especially the duty to monitor.76 If, as
argued in this Article, current fiduciary obligations on directors are
inadequate to ensure effective monitoring, the legislature and courts
should recognize a more robust duty to monitor.
B. A Broader Scope: Monitoring of Business Risk
The duty to monitor should demand boards keep themselves informed and participate in the management of the corporation in situations where we have the greatest concerns about officers’ ability to
protect shareholders’ interests. Factors to consider would be the likelihood that officers will make an error or otherwise be careless resulting in harm to the corporation and the magnitude of the potential
harm to the corporation. One reason why we may question officers’
72. See Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured
Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127 (1995); David Yermack, Renumeration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 59 J. FIN.
2281 (2004).
73. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 121-36 (2004); Assaf Hamdani &
Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1682-85 (2007).
Recent psychological research suggests that bonuses and other high monetary rewards can
actually adversely affect performance by forcing employees to focus too narrowly on their
bonus objectives. See Dan Ariely, Uri Gneezy, George Loewenstein & Nina Mazar, Large
Stakes and Big Mistakes, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 451 (2009).
74. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS.
LAW. 43, 44-46, 64-66 (2003) (describing the difficulties faced by shareholders attempting
to replace incumbent directors).
75. Many dismiss the role of fiduciary duties because of the various limitations on
directors’ personal liability for fiduciary breaches. Such objections will be addressed later
in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55 and Part V.
76. See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J.
299, 299-302 (1993) (finding fiduciary duties are necessary in a world of incomplete contracts); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual
Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 407 (1993).
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ability to work without board oversight is that they lack the appropriate objectivity.77 Likewise, we expect greater board oversight for
activities that may have a disproportionate impact on the health of
the corporation.
The duty to monitor would be more effective if courts held boards
responsible for overseeing business risk and the implementation of
business decisions. Limiting the duty to monitor only to wrongful and
illegal acts leaves out other acts, which may not be illegal but are
still harmful to the corporation. Such acts are generally harmful because they represent assumption of risk that may be considered by a
deliberative board as excessive.
The difficulty with extending the duty to monitor to require board
oversight of business risk is how such a duty would be enforced. A
court considering claims that the board failed to monitor business
risk would be tempted to substitute its business judgment for that of
the board’s. Chancellor Chandler raised this objection in the
Citigroup decision.78
It is difficult, however, to see how a court considering a board’s
failure to consider business risk would be rejecting the business
judgment of a board in favor of its own. First, a duty to monitor claim
would not exist unless the board failed to exercise any business
judgment. The purpose of the duty is to ensure that boards are vigilant and informed enough to be in a position where they can exercise
their business judgment. Furthermore, enforcement of the duty to
monitor only requires a court to consider a class of outcomes that are
harmful enough to the corporation to justify liability for oversight
failure. Appropriate outcomes should include those that result in corporate insolvency or otherwise threaten the corporation’s ability to
continue to operate as a going concern.
The distinction between liability for directorial decisions and liability for failure to monitor is one of process and substance. When the
board makes a decision, directors enjoy the full protection of the
business judgment rule, provided that they make a good faith effort to
be informed and to exercise appropriate judgment.79 The process by
which a board makes its decision is of paramount concern, and this is
77. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management 19
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 09-08, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1364500 [hereinafter Bainbridge, Caremark and Risk Management] (noting that even in situation where there is no self-dealing, executive officer selfinterest may still contribute to risk management failures).
78. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(“To the extent the Court allows shareholder plaintiffs to succeed on a theory that a director is liable for a failure to monitor business risk, the Court risks undermining the well
settled policy of Delaware law by inviting Courts to perform a hindsight evaluation of the
reasonableness or prudence of directors’ business decisions.”).
79. Id. at 124.
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the only focus of a court’s inquiry.80 The substantive outcome of the
decision is ignored entirely. Success or failure is the responsibility of
the board, and its decision will not be second-guessed by the court.81
Presumably a board that has made a bad decision will find itself subject to the ire of the shareholders at the next annual meeting.
When the board fails to act, on the other hand, a court becomes
involved because of the substantive outcome of this failure to act.
Committing illegal acts that result in criminal or civil penalties, for
example, is a substantively bad outcome for the company. The existence of this bad outcome results in a lawsuit and becomes the basis
for deciding a duty to monitor claim (i.e., that the board should have
prevented the outcome). At that point, the court must consider
whether the board was in a position to prevent or stop the illegal act.
This is ultimately an inquiry into the process followed by the board in
monitoring the activities of the corporation. This process is laid out in
the Caremark standard.82
This requirement that courts consider the substantive outcome of
a board’s inaction naturally limits the scope and application of the
duty to monitor. Courts will be uncomfortable in assessing whether a
company is doing well or poorly as a business. A duty to monitor
claim, however, can only be considered if a court concludes that the
board’s failure to act produced a bad outcome for the company. In order to get around their natural aversion to making such judgments,
judges need to seek out defined categories of outcomes where they
feel comfortable applying a duty to monitor analysis. Because judges
are experts in law, the obvious category is violations of law. Therefore, it is not surprising that Delaware courts have limited duty to
monitor claims to illegal acts. But there is no reason why courts must
constrain themselves to this narrow set of outcomes, especially since
judges retain the ability to excuse boards from liability by concluding
that they did have in place reasonable monitoring systems or did
make good faith efforts to prevent harm to the corporation. Judges
can and should be willing to take on cases involving a more expansive
list of bad outcomes that will lead them to apply a duty to monitor
analysis. This list would include, for example, performance failures
by the company that threaten the solvency of the company but do not
involve illegal acts.

80. See Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of
Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 675-76
(2002); see also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (noting that the merits of a
business decision are considered separately from the process used to reach that decision).
81. Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due
care only.”).
82. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Such a stance would be consistent with the reasoning of Graham
and Caremark. In supporting a sharper interpretation of Graham,
Chancellor Allen argued that for boards to meet their obligation to be
reasonably informed concerning the corporation they need to:
assur[e] themselves that information and reporting systems exist
in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management and the board . . . to reach
informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance
with law and its business performance.83

It is logical that systematic monitoring is a task that must be undertaken not only to ensure legal compliance but also successful (or at
least nondisastrous) business results. As Chancellor Allen himself
noted, “[d]irectors are not specialists like lawyers . . . [but rather]
general advisors of the business . . . .”84 If directors are equipped to
perform any type of monitoring, it must be of the business performance of the corporation. Courts should enforce this duty by more
aggressively applying the duty to monitor.
In order for boards to be effective monitors of business risk, they
must be independent, have adequate resources, and possess comprehensive information. Recent corporate governance reforms have
sought to address the problem of board independence. Boards also
have sought to secure additional resources to carry out their duties.
For instance, boards can, and frequently do, hire their own financial
advisors, legal counsel, and accounting firms to assist them.85 Corporations can also impose more exacting requirements on new board
members, just as Citigroup did when it began looking for directors
with “expertise in finance and investments.”86 Collection of information, however, is subject to a board’s ability to compel the CEO to
share relevant and timely information. While a more robust duty to
monitor may motivate boards to supervise officers more aggressively,
the key prerequisite must be boards’ ability to obtain comprehensive,
accurate, and timely information about corporate operations and
related risks.87
83. Id. at 970 (emphasis added); see Bainbridge, Caremark and Risk Management,
supra note 77, at 18 (“Chancellor Allen thus obviously intended the Caremark duty to extend beyond mere law compliance to include such issues as business risk management.”).
84. Caremark, 698 A.2d. at 968.
85. See, e.g., Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg.
18788 (Apr. 16, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249 & 274) (requiring public
companies to grant their audit committees the authority to engage independent counsel
and other advisors, as such committees deem necessary to carry out their duties).
86. Citigroup Director Search, CITIGROUP, INC., http://www.citigroup.com/citi/
corporategovernance/directorsearch.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
87. See Eisenberg, Board of Directors, supra note 57, at 244-46; see also Fama & Jensen, supra note 49, at 314.
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In the previous section, this Article noted the gap in perception of
boards’ ability to serve as monitors and the necessity of boards to
play a more active monitoring role. There is also a gap in perception
of boards having enough information to perform their monitoring role
and the actual extent to which corporations have systems in place
that provide boards with the information they need to be effective
monitors.88 Internal control and information reporting systems are
expensive in both time and money.89 Monitoring systems that feel
invasive to officers also may breed distrust, distract, and inhibit risk
taking.90 Despite these costs, U.S. public corporations have invested
heavily in recent years in internal control and information reporting
systems, expanding significantly the scope of these systems.
The history of internal control and information reporting systems,
especially the internal control requirements for financial reporting
imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, has been described extensively elsewhere.91 What is of greater interest is how internal control and information reporting systems have advanced since Sarbanes-Oxley. The evolving recommendations of the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)92
provide insight into the scope of internal control and information reporting systems adopted by U.S. public corporations. COSO has issued several reports that build upon its original 1992 report Internal
Control—Integrated Framework.93 The 1992 report laid out an inter88. See Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719,
724 (2007) (“Monitoring systems are . . . within the directors’ purview. They must approve
and oversee them. . . . Thus, the systems are key to the role of directors and, once established, allow directors to focus on other strategic decisions.”).
89. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting
Corporate Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 959-60
(2006) [hereinafter Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley].
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Board of Directors, supra note 57, at 240-44; Lisa M. Fairfax,
Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 56-57 (2002); Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 89, at 954-57.
92. COSO is sponsored by the five leading U.S. accounting associations: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), American Accounting Association
(AAA), Financial Executives International (FEI), Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and
Institute of Management Accountants (IMA). COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY FRAMEWORK iii (2004) [hereinafter 1 COSO 2004 REPORT].
93. COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, AIPCA, INTERNAL CONTROL—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1992) [hereinafter COSO 1992 REPORT]; see also Eisenberg, Board of Directors, supra note 57, at 244 (describing the 1992 COSO report as the
definite treatment of internal controls of its time); Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 89, at 955 (noting that the SEC recognized the 1992 COSO report
as the only suitable framework for internal controls, making the report the de facto standard); Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification
of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36636, 36641 (June 18, 2003)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270 & 274) (recognizing the
COSO framework).
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nal control framework to achieve “[e]ffectiveness and efficiency of operations[,] [r]eliability of financial reporting[,] [and] [c]ompliance
with applicable laws and regulations.”94 The focus on legal compliance and accuracy of financial reporting is consistent with the scope
of Delaware’s duty to monitor which is limited to the prevention of
illegal acts. In 2004, COSO issued Enterprise Risk Management—
Integrated Framework where COSO recommended internal control
and information reporting systems to identify, assess, and manage
“enterprise risk.”95 Enterprise risk management consists of reducing
operational surprises and losses, seizing opportunities to improve
corporate value, and improving deployment of capital—capabilities to
“help management achieve the entity’s performance and profitability
targets and prevent loss of resources.”96 What is striking about the
COSO guidance on enterprise risk is that it recasts internal controls
as being a tool to manage business risk, a task that goes far beyond
what is required of the information reporting systems mandated by
Delaware courts.97 Furthermore, COSO reaffirms boards’ role in
overseeing enterprise risk management systems and to rely not only
on reports from officers but also to draw upon internal and external
auditors and other resources.98
U.S. companies have embraced enterprise risk management. In a
2005-2006 survey of corporate directors, The Conference Board and
McKinsey & Co. found that an increasing number of directors considered overseeing business risk as their responsibility and that contemplation of business risk is part of “every conversation they have
about strategy.”99 In a 2002 survey, McKinsey found that almost half
of the directors surveyed (200 directors representing over 500 boards)
described their procedures to consider enterprise risk as “non94. See COSO 1992 REPORT, supra note 93, at 9.
95. 1 COSO 2004 REPORT, supra note 92; COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE
TREADWAY COMM’N, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK: APPLICATION TECHNIQUES (2004) [hereinafter 2 COSO 2004 REPORT].
96. See 1 COSO 2004 REPORT, supra note 92, at 3.
97. See 1 COSO 2004 REPORT, supra note 92, at 109-12, app. C (explaining how “enterprise risk management is broader than internal control”); MATTEO TONELLO, EMERGING
GOVERNANCE PRACTICE IN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 17 (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=963221 (“The Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s impact on internal control is
narrowly focused on managing the risk of fraud and ensuring accurate financial reporting.
[Enterprise risk management], on the other hand, encompasses a wider array of the business risks the corporation is exposed to, including strategic and operational risks.”). It is
helpful to note that the concept of enterprise risk management includes using risk measurement techniques such as Value-at-Risk (VaR). See GREGORY MONAHAN, ENTERPRISE
RISK MANAGEMENT: A METHODOLOGY FOR ACHIEVING STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 22-45 (2008).
VaR is commonly used to measure potential losses on trading activities. See Kimberly D.
Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 149-50 (2009).
98. 1 COSO 2004 REPORT, supra note 92, at 83-84.
99. CAROLYN KAY BRANCATO, ET AL., THE ROLE OF U.S. CORPORATE BOARDS IN ENRISK
MANAGEMENT
5-6,
15-22
(2006),
available
at
TERPRISE
http://ssrn.com/abstract=941179.
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existent or ineffective.”100 The survey also found “that non-financial
risks received only ‘anecdotal treatment’ ” in board deliberations.101
By 2005-2006, boards of large U.S. public companies assumed much
greater command of enterprise risk management with nearly 90% of
surveyed directors (127 directors) stating they believed that they approached a full or very good understanding of their corporations’
risks.102 More significantly, the survey found evidence that directors
distinguished between business risk and accuracy of financial information, and that they placed a higher priority on managing business
risk.103 The survey results suggest that by 2005-2006 most directors
of large U.S. corporations understood the need for internal control
and information reporting systems that go beyond the requirements
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
Surveyed directors also described the division of responsibilities in
the largest corporations concerning enterprise risk management.
While directors generally believe that enterprise risk management is
the responsibility of the CEO, all surveyed directors agreed that their
role consisted of both overseeing the process of risk management and
having oversight for corporate strategy.104 This result highlights how
in practice directors have embraced their role as both monitor
and manager.
The COSO recommendations and the survey results of The Conference Board and McKinsey indicate that board oversight exceeds the
minimum requirements set by the Delaware courts. Boards recognize
that they are expected and often prepared to monitor a broader range
of corporate activities, and they consider it their responsibility to manage all risks that may have a material impact on corporate performance. Delaware courts should take heed of these recent trends to
acknowledge expectations shared by shareholders and directors alike
that boards have a duty to monitor all business risks.105
C. Inferring Scienter: A Board’s Failure to Act in Good Faith as a
Rebuttable Presumption
Since Stone when the Delaware Supreme Court declared that a
board’s duty to monitor was part of its duty to act in good faith, Delaware courts have required plaintiffs to plead facts that demonstrate
100. Id. at 15.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 16.
103. See id. at 17. (53.3 percent of the surveyed directors believed strategic risk posed
the greatest threat to their firms, “while only 15.7 percent indicate[d] ‘financial risk’ as
their key concern.”).
104. Id. at 23.
105. Former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court E. Norman Veasey has argued that courts consider corporate governance trends and best practices in the development of corporate law. Veasey, supra note 59, at 2189-90.
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scienter.106 Delaware courts have described the scienter requirement
to mean that plaintiffs need to show that directors knew that they
were failing to fulfill their monitoring duties.107 It is not enough to
show that directors had the opportunity to spot wrongdoing or illegal
conduct, nor is it enough to show that the directors were or should
have been in a position to see such conduct.108 Instead, plaintiffs must
present facts to suggest that the directors acted with a “culpable
state of mind.”109 It is this culpable state of mind that lies at the
heart of the meaning of bad faith—a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities. This requirement, however, is difficult for plaintiffs to
meet. Rarely do plaintiffs have access to documents or other sources
of evidence that reveal with particularity the defendants’ state of
mind, especially at the pleading stage.110 Instead plaintiffs must convince the court to infer scienter from the board’s actions.
Scienter poses a particular problem in the context of the duty to
monitor. Plaintiffs must attempt to show that a board failed to act in
good faith by virtue of its lack of action. In such a case, what would
serve as evidence of a culpable state of mind? Vice Chancellor Strine
has suggested that culpability can be inferred by showing persistent
indolence.111 The logic is that a board may fail to monitor so persistently that the only reasonable explanation for its behavior is that it
intended to evade its monitoring duty. However, what does it mean
106. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007).
107. See, e.g., Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (“[A] plaintiff must also plead
particularized facts that demonstrate that the directors acted with scienter, i.e., that they had
‘actual or constructive knowledge’ that their conduct was legally improper.”); Desimone, 924
A.2d at 940 (“Thus, in order to state a viable Caremark claim . . . a plaintiff must plead the
existence of facts suggesting that the board knew that internal controls were inadequate, that
the inadequacies could leave room for illegal or materially harmful behavior, and that the
board chose to do nothing about the control deficiencies that it knew existed.”); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[I]mposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.”).
108. See, e.g., Desimone, 924 A.2d at 940.
109. Id. at 931.
110. Because there will not be any discovery at the time of pleading, plaintiffs will have
limited access to materials that enable them to plead with particularity. Delaware courts
have acknowledged this difficulty but have suggested a books and records request as a
suitable mechanism for procuring information. Wood, 953 A.2d at 144 n.25 (“[F]ailure to
make a books and records demand rendered plaintiff ‘unable to plead any facts about what
the . . . board did, when they did it, what they discussed, what conclusions they reached,
and why the board did or did not do anything’ . . . .” (citing Desimone, 924 A.2d at 951));
Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1057 n.52 (Del. 2004) (“[P]laintiff should pursue a books
and records inspection in order to secure the facts necessary to support an allegation of
demand futility if the factual allegations would otherwise fall short.”).
111. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 935 (“Caremark itself encouraged directors to act with reasonable diligence, but plainly held that director liability for failure to monitor required a
finding that the directors acted with the state of mind traditionally used to define the
mindset of a disloyal director—bad faith—because their indolence was so persistent that it
could not be ascribed to anything other than a knowing decision not to even try to make
sure the corporation’s officers had developed and were implementing a prudent approach to
ensuring law compliance.”).
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to fail to monitor persistently? On one hand, there is the failure to
put into place an internal control and information reporting system.
The absence of a monitoring system would seem to be a clear case of
failing to monitor. But what if the board has put in place some system? Caremark stated that the board had to have in place a “reasonably designed” system.112 Thus, plaintiffs would need to show that the
directors knew that their system was not reasonably designed—a
very difficult task to prove and one that cannot be easily inferred
from the board’s behavior.
The more fruitful line of attack for plaintiffs would be to show that
even with a monitoring system in place, the board ignored or failed to
react to information reported by the system. In other words, the monitoring system brought to the board’s attention certain red flags, and
the board failed to act in the face of such red flags. This line of argument poses two burdens on plaintiffs. First, they must tell the court
which red flags the board should have seen. Plaintiffs have attempted to point to well-publicized news commentary or market trends as
evidence of red flags, but courts have rejected these red flags as being
too broad.113 Second, they must show that the red flags actually came
to the directors’ attention and that they ignored them. This is also
difficult to demonstrate. In recent cases, courts have rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to infer that directors saw the red flags because they
either served on certain key board committees or had executed certain transaction documents.114
It is difficult to avoid the fact that the duty to monitor as articulated in Caremark does not actually require the presence of scienter
(as defined by recent Delaware court cases) but rather supports
broader applicability. In Caremark, Chancellor Allen viewed a
board’s liability as stemming from an “unconsidered failure of the
board to act.”115 After all, the purpose of the duty is to ensure that the
board does not allow itself to be caught off-guard. Chancellor Allen
would have considered the Caremark directors to have breached their
duty of care if the plaintiffs could show that the directors knew of the
wrongdoing or “should have known that violations of law were occurring.”116 This language implies some objective standard of diligence.
The purpose of the standard was to avoid the “head in the sand” behavior that Graham rewarded. Caremark, however, accepted the notion that a board should be held responsible only for knowing that
112. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
113. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 128
(Del. Ch. 2009).
114. See Wood, 953 A.2d at 142-43 (noting that it is not enough that the board approved an improper transaction or served on particular board committee as neither provides proof of the directors’ state of mind).
115. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (emphasis omitted).
116. Id. at 971 (emphasis added).
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which would be detected by a monitoring system slightly more competent than an “utter failure”—a low threshold indeed.117
Given that the first part of the Caremark standard is about ensuring that boards have in place some type of minimally adequate monitoring system, scienter is not a factor that should be taken into consideration. If anything, the scienter requirement undermines the
first part of the Caremark test because it will only serve to excuse
those directors who fail to have in place a reasonable information reporting system but just did not realize that fact. The scienter element
brings back the “head in the sand” effect of Graham, taking what was
already an extremely easy test for directors and turning it into a
meaningless one. An incurious board would always avoid liability. In
addition, it turns on its head Chancellor Allen’s purpose for recognizing some oversight liability, which was “to act as a stimulus to good
faith performance of duty by such directors.”118 In this respect, good
faith means having directors pursue their duties diligently, not that
they only need to make minimal efforts and “go through the motions”
of collecting information.
Actual knowledge also is inconsistent with the second part of the
Caremark standard. After a red flag is identified, a board’s liability
does not stem merely from the failure to act on the red flag, but rather from the failure to act due to a conscious decision or a failure to
recognize or react to the obvious danger. A conscious decision by the
board to ignore the red flag, however, is a business decision and like
all business decisions should be reviewed by the court with deference
under the business judgment rule. It is only when the failure to act
stems from board inattention or omission that a claim can be made
that the board violated its duty to monitor.
Thus, the scienter requirement does not fit comfortably with a duty that results from a lack of deliberation by the board. The scienter
requirement forces plaintiffs to undermine their own claims because
they will have to produce particularized facts that the board recognized a red flag, which undoubtedly will reveal that the board exercised its business judgment in deciding how to react to the red flag. It
is important to note that a valid business decision could be the decision to ignore a red flag. As a result, the only types of cases where
there could be a successful duty to monitor claim (provided that a
monitoring system was present) is a situation where the business
judgment rule or section 102(b)(7) exculpation would not have provided protection to begin with, which is the conduct of wrongful or
117. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, The Corporate Governance of
Banks, 9 ECON. POL’Y REV. 91, 102-03 (2003) (arguing that the Caremark standard is too
low for the banking industry because bank directors have a continuing obligation to develop and maintain detailed and elaborate systems for monitoring and oversight).
118. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971.
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illegal acts. Such a framework prevents the duty to monitor from being applied in other contexts.
Is there another way to define scienter such that plaintiffs do not
have to show actual knowledge of a problem by the board? The federal district court decision in Countrywide offers an alternative: Delaware courts could adopt the definition of scienter as applied by federal courts in deciding section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 securities fraud
cases.119 The vast majority of federal circuits have interpreted scienter to include recklessness.120 The accepted understanding of recklessness is “highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care”121 or, in the opinion of one circuit,
“carelessness approaching indifference.”122 Such a standard requires
an objective determination by the court of the defendant’s state of
mind.123 For example, the court might make such a determination by
asking if the defendant complied with applicable rules and corporate
governance standards.124 Accepting recklessness as part of scienter
invites courts to second guess the action (or inaction) of the defendant to decide if the defendant really did act in good faith. Whereas
Delaware courts’ understanding of scienter requires plaintiffs to
plead facts that show the defendant’s state of mind, recklessness sets
aside the question of what was the defendant’s actual state of mind
in favor of an inference of scienter based upon the defendant’s actions.125 The Ninth Circuit has adopted an even more refined formulation of the standard of scienter; it requires plaintiffs to plead evi-

119. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (deciding that there must be
an allegation of scienter for a cause of action under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act and rule 10b-5).
120. See JAMES D. COX, ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 670-73 (5th ed. 2006); 8 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3688-90 (3d ed. rev. 2004).
121. See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
122. Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978).
123. Paul S. Milich, Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Scienter,
Recklessness, and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 179, 185 (1986).
124. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, supra note 24, at 490 (discussing the implications of
the federal recklessness standards on the Delaware duty of good faith).
125. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 515
(2009) (“As with any mental state, scienter cannot be established by direct evidence, but
only circumstantially.”); see also Milich, supra note 123, at 187-91. Milich describes this
understanding of scienter as the “disjunctive approach” where recklessness is determined
independently of intent. Id. at 187. As noted by Milich, Oliver Wendell Holmes advocated
the disjunctive approach: “[I]t means that the law, applying a general objective standard,
determines that, if a man makes his statement on . . . [grossly insufficient] data, he is liable, whatever was the state of his mind, and although he individually may have been perfectly free of wickedness in making it.” Id. at 188 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW 108 (1963 ed.) (emphasis omitted)). Milich notes that most federal courts
followed the disjunctive approach in their application of recklessness. Id. at 191-92.
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dence of “deliberate recklessness.”126 Deliberate recklessness implies
that courts should still seek evidence of the defendant’s state of
mind.127 Delaware courts may find deliberate recklessness as a possible middle ground for incorporating recklessness into its understanding of scienter.
To illustrate how a deliberate recklessness standard broadens the
scope of the duty to monitor, consider In re Countrywide Financial
Corp. Derivative Litigation.128 Countrywide was a decision of the U.S.
District Court of the Central District of California concerning director violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and the Delaware duty to monitor.129 The plaintiffs sought to hold
certain directors responsible for approving an increase in the origination of non-conforming loans, extending in contravention of company
underwriting standards, and failing to maintain appropriate reserves
and allowances to offset the company’s riskier loan portfolio.130 Like
the Citigroup board, the Countrywide board approved a strategy and
set of business practices that exposed the firm to greater risk.
Countrywide presents an interesting case because it is a duty to
monitor case decided by a federal court. Furthermore, the federal
court was deciding the monitoring claims alongside the section 10(b)
claims. The court applied the Ninth Circuit standard of “deliberate
recklessness.”131 In applying this standard, the district court made
more aggressive inferences of the board’s scienter beyond what would
have been made by any Delaware court. Evidence of deliberate reck126. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974, 976-77 (citing Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569) (9th Cir. 1999). Despite being the only circuit to require “deliberate recklessness” to prove scienter, the Ninth Circuit, like the rest of the federal circuits,
has agreed that Congress did not change the scienter standard in the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) when it
imposed the requirement that every complaint “state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(2) (2006). See Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000). As
to whether the same provision of the PSLRA changed the pleading requirements for scienter, the U.S. Supreme Court settled this question in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007), when it concluded that Congress intended to strengthen existing
pleading requirements. Id. at 310 (“A complaint will survive only if a reasonable person
would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any plausible
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”). The Tellabs decision brought
the federal pleading standard closer to the Delaware pleading standard.
127. In a recent case, SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., however, the Ninth Circuit
appeared to open the door to applying a scienter standard much closer to the less burdensome recklessness standard accepted in other federal circuits. 617 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.
2010). While it affirmed the deliberate recklessness standard, it permitted plaintiffs to
pass summary judgment by an objective evaluation of the defendant’s mental state as opposed to a subjective evaluation of the defendant’s actual state of mind. See id. at 1093-94.
128. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
129. See id. at 1057-71, 1077-83.
130. Id. at 1050-52.
131. Id. at 1057.
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lessness included statements of fourteen low-level employees (out of
50,000 employees) describing the deterioration of Countrywide’s underwriting standards.132 Even though the plaintiffs could not show
that the directors had any contact with these employees or that concerns raised by the employees ever reached the directors, the court
concluded that the defendants must have known about what was
happening because the underwriting practices were so pervasive
across the corporation.133 Other evidence of deliberate recklessness
was the fact that the defendants served on key board committees responsible for monitoring Countrywide’s financial statements.134 The
plaintiffs convinced the court that the financial impact of the problematic loans constituted red flags that must have been seen by any
director who was on a board committee tasked with preparing or reviewing the corporation’s financial statements.135 Again, the court did
not require plaintiffs to show that the defendants actually had
knowledge of these red flags or proof that such red flags were brought
to the attention of the defendants. The Countrywide decision shows
that recognition of recklessness shifts the understanding of scienter
away from what the defendants actually did know toward what they
should have known or were in a position to know.
With its reliance on objective criteria to judge a board’s behavior,
the deliberate recklessness standard looks suspiciously like gross
negligence, and this poses a problem under Delaware law. Gross negligence has long been considered under Delaware law as a breach of
the duty of care exculpated by section 102(b)(7). But, as noted by
Chancellor Chandler, Delaware’s gross negligence standard has
shown some elasticity over the past few years.136 Before the Delaware
Supreme Court explained the meaning of the duty of good faith in
Brehm and Stone, Delaware courts defined gross negligence as “reck132. See id. at 1058.
133. See id. at 1058-59.
134. See id. at 1060.
135. See id. at 1062. Rather than demanding that the plaintiffs present facts demonstrating actual knowledge by the directors of the wrongful acts conducted by the officers
and employees of the company, the court instead inferred directors’ knowledge from their
positions on at least one of the key board committees “charged with oversight of Countrywide’s risk exposures, investment portfolio, and loan loss reserves. As such, they were in a
position to recognize the significance of these red flags, and, accordingly, investigate the
extent to which underwriting standards had been abandoned.” Id. at 1062 (footnote omitted). The court specifically identified the relevant board committees to be the Audit and
Ethics Committee, the Credit Committee, the Finance Committee, the Compensation
Committee, and the Operations and Public Policy Committee. Id. at 1062 n.13.
136. See McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274 (Del. Ch. 2008). Part of the challenge
for Delaware courts is trying to separate a scienter-based understanding of good faith from
the duty of care analysis inherent in defining gross negligence. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith,
Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55
DUKE L.J. 1, 33 (2005) (“My only point here is a descriptive one—that is, to point out that
moving good faith to a substantive standard of intent does not avoid repetition of duty-ofcare analytics and, ultimately, confrontation with the business judgment rule.”).
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less indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of
stockholders or actions which are without the bounds of reason.”137
Since then, good faith has become separated from the original definition of gross negligence to mean “intentional dereliction of duty or
conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities,” and gross negligence in
turn is now defined as “reckless indifference or actions without the
bound of reason.”138 Of course, these definitions offer little guidance
in the abstract. Only through consideration of actual cases will the
distinction between gross negligence and good faith be fully understood.139 The challenge will be to incorporate the standard of deliberate recklessness into scienter in such a way that directors will not be
found liable for only grossly negligent behavior.
One solution is to make a plaintiff’s claim of bad faith for a failure
to monitor a rebuttable presumption. Plaintiffs should be allowed to
demonstrate scienter by pleading facts that show a board’s deliberate
recklessness. The burden then should be on the board to rebut the
plaintiff’s case by providing evidence that it did carry out its monitoring responsibilities in good faith. This can mean demonstrating to the
court the manner in which the board ensured that a reasonable monitoring system was put into place, the extent to which the board considered the findings of such monitoring system, and the exercise of its
business judgment in considering red flags identified by the system.
We expect boards to act in good faith, and we must consider the
difficulty of determining if a board has acted in good faith when we
are trying to discern the board’s state of mind from the absence of its
action. Our hope is that boards make good faith efforts to oversee
corporate activities and prevent the occurrence of harmful events.
The current standard, however, presumes that boards are monitoring
in good faith—a questionable presumption given long-standing concerns about board independence and qualifications. Turning good
faith into a rebuttable presumption will encourage boards to take affirmative steps to exert monitoring efforts. More importantly, a rebuttable presumption allows a court still to consider a director’s state
of mind without imposing a near impossible burden on the plaintiff.
It becomes the job of the defendant to explain how his recklessness
does not constitute culpable conduct.

137. Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 891 A.2d 150, 192 (Del. Ch. 2005) (citing Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., CIV. A. No. 7861, 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 5, 1990)).
138. See, e.g, id.
139. See Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, supra note 24, at 491.
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D. Monitoring After a Business Decision
In addition to addressing the question of what the duty to monitor
should apply to (i.e., legal and business risks), courts also should rethink when the duty to monitor should apply. Chancellor Allen was
very firm in Caremark to distinguish between “liability for directorial
decisions” and “liability for failure to monitor.”140 But Chancellor Allen did not address a third situation where the board has made a decision—a decision that exposes the company to extensive business
risk—and the board does not follow up on the decision and monitor
its effects. What makes this situation different from the directorial
decision situation contemplated by Chancellor Allen is that some decisions do not have immediate effect on the corporation and that these decisions are based upon assumptions made in the face of great
uncertainty. In other words, decisions are subject to dynamic conditions. What may be considered initially an appropriate decision for the
corporation may become a reckless and harmful decision as facts become
known and conditions change. Arguably, these so-called “decisions subject to change” are the types of decisions more commonly made by
boards than the types of decisions where there is immediate effect because boards tend to be involved more often in the setting of long-term
corporate strategy rather than in the making of day-to-day decisions.
The Citigroup case is such an example. The Citigroup board made
a business decision to expose the firm to greater trading risks in order to achieve higher profits.141 After the decision was made, however, the board relied on management to implement the strategy and
did not inform itself of the manner in which the strategy was being
implemented.142 Two years later, the board became aware for the first
time that the activities of the firm stemming from its original decision had produced losses that threatened the solvency of the firm.143
Extending business judgment rule protection to the board for its early 2005 decision would be inappropriate given the length of time that
had passed since the initial decision and the fact that conditions had
changed so dramatically in that period. The Citigroup situation also
raises the question of implementation. A trading strategy approved
by the board was implemented in a manner where excessive risk was

140. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Chancellor Allen did not believe that the duty of monitor plays into board decisions because
most corporate decisions do not involve the board. The board is only involved in the most
significant corporate acts. See id.
141. See Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2008, at A1; see also In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106,
112-14 (Del. Ch. 2009).
142. Dash & Creswell, supra note 141, at A1.
143. Id.
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taken on by the firm without the board’s knowledge.144 Failure of the
board to ensure that there is proper implementation of corporate
strategy is a form of board inaction and, therefore, a breach of the
duty to monitor.
One can anticipate the counter-argument that the Citigroup situation is a unique case because the financial crisis was an improbable
event. The financial crisis caught many financial institutions offguard and is considered by many as a tail event, albeit a fat tail
event.145 To hold boards liable for failing to anticipate improbable
events would result in overinvestment in monitoring. But the fact of
the matter is that there are many occasions where boards make decisions in the face of uncertainty and where follow-up monitoring by
the board after the initial decision is desirable.146 To illustrate, consider a different example, one that does not relate to the circumstances of the financial crisis. A company finds itself struggling
against fierce domestic and foreign competition. In order to save the
company, the board authorizes management to develop a new product that, if successful, would revolutionize the market and restore the
company’s position as a market leader. This project would require the
devotion of a substantial amount of the company’s resources, and its
failure would likely leave the company too financially weakened to
ever again be a serious competitor, forcing the dissolution or sale of
the company. Such a scenario broadly describes any “bet the company” decision by a board, whether it was Boeing’s decision in the
1960s to build the 747 jumbo jet147 or General Motors’ plan to build
the battery-powered Chevrolet Volt.148 These decisions go to the heart
of the board’s role as monitor and manager. Because of the signifi144. The board relied entirely on company employees. One director said, “There is no
way you would know what was going on with a risk book unless you’re directly involved
with the trading arena. . . . We had highly experienced, highly qualified people running the
operation.” Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Where Was the Wise Man?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
27, 2008, at 1.
145. See, e.g., NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY
IMPROBABLE (2007) (popularizing the notion that the interconnectedness of global financial
institutions made them more susceptible to market events that lay outside
regular expectations).
146. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 53, at 32 (“If the review process leads the board to
approve corporate actions, the board must stand behind its assent. This support entails
sharing with the CEO the risks of the decisions it approves, and the board should not approve decisions until it is fully willing to accept those risks.”).
147. EUGENE RODGERS, FLYING HIGH: THE STORY OF BOEING AND THE RISE OF THE JETLINER INDUSTRY 288 (1996) (“Although the 747 in its mature years helped Boeing to the
pinnacle of financial success, the trauma of its birth nearly destroyed the company.”).
148. Jonathan Rauch, Electro-Shock Therapy: with the Chevy Volt, General Motors—
Battered, Struggling for Profitability, Fed Up with Being Eclipsed by Toyota and the Prius—Is Out to Reinvent the Automobile, and Itself, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July-Aug.
2008, at 84 (“Can GM pull this off? Whenever I asked this question inside the company, I
got one or another version of the same answer: ‘Failure is not an option.’ . . . [E]veryone
agreed that failure on the Volt, real or perceived, would be a severe setback.”).
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cance of the project to the corporation’s ability to survive and the risk
of the project, the board’s role should not end, nor should the board’s
liability be extinguished, at the time the decision is made. Rather, we
would expect that an informed board would revisit its initial decision
and decide whether such project or strategy should be continued,
modified, or terminated.149
Again, the primary burden placed by the duty to monitor on the
board is to be informed and to follow a process to consider such information and evaluate relevant risks. A board’s judgment to defer to the
CEO or to accept great business risk is a board’s prerogative and
should not be questioned by a court. For example, as dreadful as the
outcome may have been for the shareholders of Citigroup, the
Citigroup board would have clearly met its duty to monitor—even the
more robust duty suggested by this Article—if the board had shown
itself to be informed of the risks being taken by the firm. With this in
mind, courts should recognize that this monitoring duty applies to a
broader range of cases than that contemplated by the current doctrine.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF A MORE ROBUST DUTY TO MONITOR
A more robust duty to monitor that would include holding boards
liable for monitoring business risks and require follow-up monitoring
by boards would raise several concerns. The first concern is that such
a standard would invite, if not require, judges to substitute their
business judgment for that of the board. Such a role for judges would
go against the basic principles of the business judgment rule. Judges
would be evaluating the performance of directors with the benefit of
perfect hindsight.150 It would be too tempting for judges to determine
that the board missed obvious red flags and therefore breached its
duty to monitor. As stated earlier, however, the duty to monitor does
not ask nor want a court to second guess the judgment of the board.
The duty to monitor only applies when there is evidence that the
board, as a result of its complacency, failed to keep itself informed of
the potential legal and business risks facing the corporation. Furthermore, the types of business risk that this Article suggests should
be covered by the duty to monitor are those risks which might
threaten the solvency of the corporation or otherwise prevent the
corporation from continuing as a going concern. The duty to monitor
does not require courts to replace boards. Instead, courts should only
149. One would need to be careful to avoid the problem of overcommitment where a
board would resist recognizing evidence that their initial decision may have been wrong.
See Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards, supra note 67, at 811.
150. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine,
57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the
Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 588-89 (1994)
(noting that hindsight tends to make harmful outcomes seem more foreseeable).
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consider the procedures pursuant to which the board acted to keep
itself informed and evaluate any response by the board to red flags.
A second concern is that a more robust duty to monitor would substantially increase the amount of potential personal liability directors
will face. It is easy to recall the howls of protest from corporate directors across the United States that followed Smith v. Van Gorkom
when the Delaware Supreme Court decided that the Trans Union
board members breached their duty of care.151 Greater liability produces two unwelcome outcomes. First, boards will become overly cautious and avoid the taking of risks that benefit shareholders—
shareholders whose appetite for risk is actually greater because of
their ability to diversify risk across a portfolio of companies.152 Second, the higher threat of liability will deter qualified candidates
from agreeing to serve on boards.153
It is difficult to refute entirely these concerns in the abstract. It is
possible that there may be risk averse directors who will overreact to
the possibility of liability and act in the manner stated above.154 But
the relevant path of inquiry should be whether the duty to monitor
suggested in this Article would require directors to do anything more
than what shareholders would require them to do anyway. In other
words, it is not clear that the actual amount of personal liability
faced by a director would require a greater amount of effort than
what a diligent director already expends. Even in its strongest form,
the duty to monitor requires boards to invest in internal control and
information reporting systems that would collect and deliver information about possible legal and business risks. The standard suggested by this Article continues to follow the Caremark standard that
the board’s duty is to attempt in good faith to have a reasonable information reporting system in place. As Chancellor Allen indicated,
and this Article agrees, this standard is not a difficult one for directors to meet and should not deter any qualified director from serving
on a board.155 The second part of the standard is the burden on the
board if such systems do report business and legal risks. The burden

151. See Leo Strine, Lawrence Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law 41-44 (Widener
U. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 09-13, Harvard U. Sch. of Law, Discussion Paper No.
630, Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349971.
152. See Bainbridge, Caremark and Risk Management, supra note 77, at 21-24; Veasey,
supra note 59, at 2185.
153. Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2006).
154. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards, supra note 67, at 823-25
(arguing that corporate executives often have an incorrect impression of the actual risk of
liability and overestimate such risk); Veasey, supra note 59, at 2186.
155. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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is actually extremely modest. So long as the board is willing to consider in good faith the relevant risks, it has met the burden.
If the duty to monitor does drive away certain persons from serving on boards, overall, this effect may be a desirable one. Those persons who will be most sensitive to the demands of the duty to monitor
will be those who either lack the qualifications to carry out the necessary monitoring responsibilities or who cannot devote the additional
time and other resources demanded by a stronger duty to monitor.
Citigroup’s call for director candidates with experience in finance and
investments was an admission that its board lacked the necessary
expertise to effectively understand the firm’s risk.156 It is also reasonable to assume that boards that permit certain harm to the corporation to occur as a result of their complacency are often composed of
persons who lack the time, interest, or motivation to fulfill their appropriate oversight role. If the effect of a more robust duty to monitor
is that such persons do not wish to serve on boards, then we should
applaud the end result.
A third concern is that the duty to monitor, as advocated in this
Article, will usurp the board’s discretion in determining the appropriate degree of monitoring and inhibit risk-taking. We do not want
the duty to monitor to prevent corporations from conducting certain
activities that may actually benefit the company and its shareholders.157 In other words, the board may conclude it is in the best interest of the corporation for it to expose itself to extreme amounts of
business risk.158 Furthermore, the board should decide on its own
how much it wishes to invest in an internal control and information
reporting system.159 Such systems are expensive in both management
and employee time and money.160 Thus, boards should be permitted
to limit their investment in internal control and information reporting systems if they conclude that corporate resources would be better
spent elsewhere.
With respect to the first part of the concern, the ability of the
board to decide on the level of risk it wishes to assume remains untouched. In fact, boards will have more flexibility to decide on the ap156. Citigroup Director Search, supra note 86 (advertising that “the Board is actively seeking new directors who meet the criteria . . . with a particular emphasis on expertise in finance
and investments”); see also Eric Dash, Dean of Harvard Business School May Join Citigroup’s
Board, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at C2 (noting that none of Citigroup’s independent directors,
except for a recent addition to the board, had substantial finance experience).
157. See CLARK, supra note 39, at 132-33.
158. See, e.g., id.
159. See id.
160. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 93-100 (2002). It was estimated that
U.S. companies had to spend up to $2.9 million to comply with section 404 of the SarbanesOxley Act. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1587 (2005).
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propriate level of business risk than they currently have in deciding
when it is acceptable for the company to take on legal risk given the
prohibition against the conduct of illegal activities by a corporation.161
The more serious criticism is that the duty to monitor prevents
boards from deciding how much they wish to invest in monitoring
systems. This criticism is valid. A more robust duty to monitor would
require directors to put into place more extensive information reporting systems to detect possible legal violations, ensure the accuracy of
financial information, and manage business risk. But the power of
this criticism assumes that boards in the current environment already invest the optimal amount in monitoring systems. If we believe
that boards, in the absence of an effective duty to monitor, generally
under-invest in monitoring systems, then the revised standard may
be correcting erroneous practice.162 The fact is that we do not have
evidence to know if the types of systems required to meet a tougher
duty to monitor actually represent an appropriate level of investment
or an over-investment in such systems. As noted by this Article, a
duty to monitor including business risk tracks accepted risk management practice in large U.S. public companies.
The fourth concern is that the duty to monitor is unnecessary.
Shareholders do not need the protection afforded by the duty to monitor, as they can protect themselves through owning a diversified
portfolio of investments or exiting from companies that they feel are
improperly managed. Alternatively, shareholders can ensure efficient
director oversight through their power to elect members of the board.
The strength of such criticism depends on how much faith one puts in
the ability of shareholders to collect the information needed to rebalance their investment portfolios appropriately and influence the
corporation’s governance. By all accounts, one would have to be quite
optimistic to believe that shareholders can protect themselves sufficiently without the assistance of fiduciary duties, such as a duty to
monitor. The duty to monitor is partially based upon the belief that
directors will not have the necessary information to conduct appropriate oversight without the implementation of a reasonable monitoring system. If this assumption is correct, it is highly unlikely that
161. See, e.g., Metro Commc’n Corp. BVI v. Advanced Mobilecomm Techs., Inc., 854
A.2d 121, 131 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Under Delaware law, a fiduciary may not choose to manage
an entity in an illegal fashion, even if the fiduciary believes that the illegal activity will
result in profits for the entity.”); see also S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule
Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 129-30 (1979) (“Bad faith may preclude the application of
the business judgment defense where directors knowlingly [sic] violate a statute or comparable expression of public policy, even if such a violation is undertaken in the corporation’s
best interests.”).
162. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 89, at 958 (noting
that “[s]enior managers might choose to under-invest in monitoring the activities of subordinates for a variety of selfish reasons”).
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shareholders will be on equal footing to make the appropriate evaluations. And in order to give shareholders the necessary information
there would need to be additional requirements through federal securities law.163 Furthermore, shareholders, especially diverse shareholders of public companies, have difficulty exerting influence on
management.164 Many of the corporate governance initiatives in
vogue today are attempting to give shareholders a bigger voice in the
management of the corporation, but it would be a mistake to assume
that the board should not serve as the primary monitor of the
corporation’s activities.
V. DUTY TO MONITOR’S EFFECT ON DIRECTOR BEHAVIOR: DIRECTOR
LIABILITY AND CORPORATE NORMS
What is the point of making the duty to monitor more robust if
directors never face out-of-pocket liability? The fact that outside directors almost always escape personal liability for fiduciary breaches
overshadows any proposal to intensify fiduciary obligations. Delaware, like most states, offers a variety of mechanisms to shield directors from personal liability and having to pay out-of-pocket expenses.
Section 102(b)(7) allows corporations to exculpate directors’ liability
for duty of care violations.165 Section 145 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law permits corporations to indemnify directors for all
settlements or judgments and cover their legal expenses.166 Section
145 also empowers corporations to purchase directors’ and officers’
(D&O) insurance for its board members.167 Unlike section 102(b)(7)
exculpation and indemnification, there are no statutory limits on the
coverage of D&O insurance. Even though the terms of most policies
will not cover insurance claims for suits based upon deliberate fraud
or personal profit, these exclusions are narrower than the good faith

163. See Sale, Independent Directors, supra note 68, at 1380 (noting that the absence of
substantive state review has led to reliance on federal securities law, the need for additional disclosure, and the hope that investors and other market participants will engage in
substantive review of a company’s corporate activities). There are also limitations on the
ability of shareholders to obtain information from the corporation in “real time.” Delaware
courts have acknowledged the difficulty of managers sharing information with shareholders because of the need to maintain secrecy (see Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,
559 A.2d 278, 290 (Del. Ch. 1989)) or the complexity of the information (see Chesapeake
Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 332 (Del. Ch. 2000)).
164. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001); Mark J.
Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 539 (2000).
165. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2010).
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2010). Indemnification is conditioned on directors
having acted in good faith and “in a manner [they] reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.” Id. § 145(a).
167. Id. § 145(g).
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exclusions under section 102(b)(7) and indemnification.168 The fact of
the matter is that a well-designed D&O insurance policy will cover
all damages or settlement payments resulting from an action against
a director for violating her duty to monitor. Given that almost all
public companies pay for D&O insurance, directors have little to fear
for their personal wealth from violating their duty to monitor.
In their seminal and exhaustive study of outside director liability,
Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner scoured almost
4000 cases and several hundred settlements and judgments and
found that the risk of personal liability to outside directors is effectively nonexistent.169 Black, et al. found only thirteen cases where
directors of public companies had to make personal payments (either
as part of judgments or settlements) in the course of twenty-five
years (1980-2005) of securities class action suits, SEC enforcement
actions, and shareholder derivative suits.170 Only three of the thirteen cases pertained to fiduciary duty breaches.171 Significantly, personal liability in almost all of these cases would have been avoided
with properly designed D&O insurance policies.
The absence of personal liability raises legitimate questions about
the purpose of imposing on boards more demanding fiduciary duties.
More robust duties may increase the likelihood of lawsuits, but even
then directors will remain untouched. In the meantime, corporations
will bear the cost of litigation, settlements, judgments, and D&O
insurance premiums.
Focusing on out-of-pocket payments, however, understates the
case for how recognizing a more robust duty to monitor will change
director behavior. When accused of fiduciary breaches, directors face
costs that go beyond their direct pecuniary interests. Most obviously,
directors bear the nuisance of having to participate in legal proceedings, especially the commitment of personal time. The more significant cost, however, is to a director’s reputation. If the claim is successful, the director may be forced to resign or fail to be re-elected at
the next board election.172 In addition, the continuing presence of di168. Black, et al., supra note 153, at 1086.
169. See id. at 1064-76.
170. See id. at 1055.
171. See id. at 1070-74. One of three cases was Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 2009), which inspired the passage of section 102(b)(7). See Strine, et al., supra note
151, at 42.
172. Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders: Evidence on
Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When Firms Default, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355,
356 (1990) (noting an increase in board turnover following corporate failures/bankruptcy).
But see Anup Agrawal, Jeffrey F. Jaffe & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Management Turnover and
Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud, 17 J.L. ECON. 309, 311 (1999)
(finding no association between occurrence of corporate fraud and subsequent managerial
or board turnover).
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rectors who have been sued also increases the probability of future
lawsuits as these directors develop a reputation for being weak monitors.173 A successful claim also makes a director less attractive as a
candidate to serve on other boards. In outlining their theory on the
separation of ownership and control, Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen described a market for outside directors where outside directors
compete for open board positions.174 More respected directors would
receive more board invitations. Therefore, serving on multiple boards
would be a marker of the director’s quality and prestige. Several
studies support the existence of this market, finding a correlation
between corporate performance and additional board seats.175 The
study by Fich and Shivdasani, for example, found that outside directors experience a significant decline in the number of opportunities to
join other boards after the discovery of financial fraud.176 Outside directors face an especially strong reputational hit because they bear
greater responsibility for monitoring fraud. Consequently, reputational costs are real, and directors have the incentive to meet their
fiduciary obligations to the fullest extent possible.
Delaware courts’ ability to change board behavior, however, does
not come only from its power to mete out punishment. It also comes
from their power to define and change prevailing corporate governance norms. Judges achieve this through detailed commentary in
their judicial opinions, speeches, and articles about the expected duties and responsibilities of directors and officers—what Claire Hill
and Brett McDonnell have called the “penumbra of Delaware corporate law.”177 Delaware judges’ influence on U.S. corporate law is high
173. Eliezer N. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and
Shareholder Wealth, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 308 (2007).
174. See Fama & Jenson, supra note 49, at 315.
175. Yermack, supra note 72, at 2281-2304 (estimating that the total pay-performance
sensitivity for fifth year outside directors to be 11 cents per $1,000 change in shareholder
wealth, of which the likelihood of obtaining new directorships constitutes 4.3 cents or 40%
of the director’s total performance incentives); see also Stephen P. Ferris, Murali Jagannathan & A.C. Pritchard, Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments, 58 J. FIN. 1087, 1088 (2003); Suraj Srinivasan, Consequences of
Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements
and Audit Committee Members, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 291, 292 (2005). But see Eric Helland,
Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON.
365, 366 (2006) (finding little evidence of a negative reputational effect associated with
allegations of fraud except in the case of the largest shareholder class actions suits).
176. See Fich & Shivdasani, supra note 173.
177. Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporation Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333, 354 (2009). Others have also
commented on how decisions and commentary by judges change board behavior. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 442 (2001); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How
Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997); Edward B. Rock
& Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing
Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1695-96 (2001).
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because they frequently interact with the bar and are not shy to provide guidance on expected corporate governance practices.178 These
pronouncements, and the responses from the bar, shareholder activists, academics, and corporate leaders, produce a rich body of commentary that help shape the legal and business community’s understanding of best practices of corporate governance.179 It also is a
means by which Delaware courts can clarify the meaning of various
legal standards, including the scope and application of the duty to
monitor.
These norms in turn affect the culture of the corporate board.
Greater exhortations from Delaware courts for boards to engage in
more robust monitoring of business risks and the implementation of
past business decisions will shape the composition of boards and how
boards go about their business. Board nominating committees will
search for directors who have good reputations as monitors and possess relevant expertise and qualifications. Directors themselves will
adjust their own expectations regarding the amount of time and effort
they will need to spend on their positions. D&O insurance providers,
who keenly observe the culture of corporate boards, will note changes
and may reward the more proactive boards with lower D&O insurance
premiums.180 Thus, it is within the Delaware courts’ power to make
meaningful changes in how boards fulfill their duty to monitor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Risk management is a corporate governance problem. Officers and
employees of the corporation make decisions every day that put the
corporation at risk. A careful balance must be struck between encouraging risk-taking by these officers and employees—to take
chances to grow the business and exploit new opportunities—and the
need for control and supervision to ensure that risks are taken in an
appropriate and reasoned manner. The recent catastrophic losses suffered by our large financial institutions remind us that there are
downside risks that need to be managed and spur us to ask whether
our corporate governance laws have struck the right balance.

178. See, e.g., Myron T. Steele & J.W. Verret, Delaware’s Guidance: Ensuring Equity
for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 189, 193 (2007); E. Norman Veasey &
Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance
from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399,
1403 (2005).
179. For recent commentary, see THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/ (last
visited Mar. 18, 2011).
180. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence
from the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487,
530-31 (2007).
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Courts, especially the Delaware courts, play a crucial role in adjusting this balance. Courts need to be more aware of the expectations of shareholders, regulators, and even the directors themselves
about how risks should be taken and managed. Courts should study
the director-officer relationship and recognize how important it is for
boards to make the effort to collect the right type of information
about the corporation and be prepared to second-guess the risk perceptions of the officers.181 Strengthening the fiduciary duty to monitor
is crucial to this task.182 The board’s duty to monitor should be especially great when the corporation takes risks that may threaten its
survival. Often these are the times when the CEO is most likely to
take extreme risks to the detriment of the enterprise.183
It must be noted that if Delaware courts do nothing and the duty
to monitor continues to languish, the federal government will likely
fill the void, imposing new rules to force boards to be better informed
and manage business risks.184 Already in most areas of corporate law,
181. See Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards, supra note 67, at 803
(noting that the CEO’s risk perceptions tend to be tainted by an optimistic bias).
182. The recognition of the importance of the board to serve as monitor and the failure
of securities law to ensure that boards are kept fully informed of the operations of the corporation have driven others also to look to fiduciary duties to force internal disclosure of
information. Donald Langevoort, for example, argues for the enforcement of a “duty of candor” on executive officers to report information upwards to the board. Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1187, 1194-96 (2003).
183. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 724-27 (1992) (noting
that a CEO will take more aggressive steps when she fears that termination is likely because subpar performance becomes clear to the board).
184. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2504-28 (2005) (offering an explanation for why Delaware tends to lose ground to the federal government
when federal authorities decide a particular corporate governance issue is important to the
U.S. economy); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860 (2003) (noting that federal
securities law, particularly through operation of shareholder litigation, has been the primary source of corporate governance regulation in the United States); see also Roberta S.
Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 80 (2005) (noting
that the SEC has wanted to regulate the composition and structure of corporate boards
since long before the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley).
As of mid-2009, political conditions are ripe for federal action in imposing a more
substantial duty to monitor. There is widespread public outrage over the perceived recklessness of corporate managers, especially those at the major financial institutions. Some
members of Congress argue that one of the causes of the current financial crisis is the failure of corporate governance. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Charles E. Schumer, Schumer, Cantwell Announce ‘Shareholder Bill of Rights’ to Impose Greater Accountability on
Corporate America (May 19, 2009), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/new_website/
record.cfm?id=313468. As a result, new legislation has been proposed in the Senate to give
more power to shareholders and to require all public company boards to create risk committees for the purpose of managing corporate risk. See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of
2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. (2009); Corporate and Financial Institution Compensation
Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 3269, 111th Cong. (2009). Similar initiatives are under consideration at the Securities Exchange Commission, including new requirements for corpora-
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federal law has imposed more stringent requirements on public companies than those set by state courts and legislatures, preempting in
many cases the applicability of state corporate law.185 Delaware has
an interest in ensuring that it protects its role as the leading corporate law jurisdiction and take the lead on defining a meaningful
monitoring duty.186
Fortunately, Delaware courts have tremendous influence over
prevailing corporate governance practices. Opinions and commentary
by judges develop and define norms and best practices that affect director behavior, often more so than the threat of legal liability.
Courts now should begin speaking out about the importance of a
board’s duty to monitor and to back up their exhortations by expanding the scope and application of the duty in future cases.

tions to disclose how the corporation’s board is involved in the management of risk. See
Chairman, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Mary L. Schapiro, Address to the Council of Institutional
Investors
(Apr.
6,
2009),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch040609mls.htm. Disclosure requirements can
have the effect of imposing a substantive standard of care on corporations. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Seeking Sunlight in Santa Fe’s Shadow: The SEC’s Pursuit of Managerial
Accountability, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 451 (2001) (noting that since it is unlikely that governance abuses will be disclosed, breaches of fiduciary duties can almost always be cast in
terms of fraud or misrepresentation); Thompson & Sale, supra, at 874 (forcing managers to
disclose how they intend to address an issue of concern has the effect of regulating the
managers’ conduct and manner of meeting their fiduciary obligations).
185. Thompson & Sale, supra note 184, at 861 (noting that one of the few areas where
state corporate law continues to govern exclusively is corporate decisions pertaining to
change of control and self-dealing transactions).
186. As the most popular jurisdiction for incorporations, Delaware is in competition
with the federal government regarding the setting of corporate governance rules. See Mark
J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 592 (2003). Evidence of Delaware’s
sensitivity to federal government corporate governance regulation is apparent from Delaware’s recent addition of sections 112 and 113 to the Delaware General Corporation Law
which permit Delaware corporations to adopt bylaws permitting shareholder proxy access
for the election of directors and reimbursement of shareholders’ proxy solicitation expenses. See H.B. 19, 145th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2009), 77 Del. Laws 14. This legislation follows high-profile consideration of certain shareholder proxy access rules by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2003 and 2007. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Announces Roundtable Discussions Regarding Proxy Process (Apr. 24,
2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-71.htm.

